# [Strange Loop of Being](releases/2025/Strange%20Loop%20of%20Being/Strange%20Loop%20of%20Being.md) # Chapter 8: Unspoken Contracts *Convention, Language Games, and Social Trust* While powerful narratives—myths, histories, ideologies—provide the grand frameworks and compelling content for many shared belief systems operating at Level 2 of the Levels of Meaning Loop, they do not function in isolation. The meaning engine requires additional crucial components to operate smoothly and reliably within a community. Symbols gain traction and beliefs become actionable not just through stories, but through the establishment and maintenance of **conventions**: the often unspoken rules, shared habits, implicit agreements, and standardized practices that govern how symbols are used and interpreted in everyday life. Furthermore, the entire edifice of shared meaning rests upon a foundation of **social trust**—trust in the reliability of conventions, trust in the intentions of others participating in the system, and trust in the institutions that often guarantee or regulate these symbolic interactions. This chapter delves into these vital, often less visible, mechanisms of Level 2, exploring how conventions emerge from practice, how meaning is shaped by use within specific “language games” (Wittgenstein), and why social trust is the indispensable lubricant for the strange loops of shared reality. Conventions are essentially emergent solutions to recurring coordination problems faced by social groups. How should we greet each other to signal peaceful intent? Which side of the road should we drive on to avoid collisions? How do we take turns in conversation to ensure mutual understanding? What sequence of sounds corresponds reliably to which concept in our shared language? While some conventions become explicitly codified into laws or formal rules (like traffic regulations), a vast number operate as **social norms** or ingrained **habits**, learned through observation and participation, often functioning below the level of conscious awareness. Think about the complex, largely unstated rules governing appropriate physical proximity between speakers (proxemics), the acceptable duration of eye contact, the subtle vocal inflections indicating politeness or sarcasm, or the expected sequence of actions in a routine social encounter like ordering coffee. These conventions provide predictability and shared expectations, reducing uncertainty and allowing social interactions to proceed smoothly and efficiently without constant negotiation or potential conflict. They form the invisible grammar of social life. In the realm of symbols, conventions are absolutely fundamental. As Saussure emphasized with the arbitrariness of the sign, the link between a symbol (Level 1) and its meaning (Level 2) is not natural but purely conventional. We understand the word “dog” to refer to a specific type of canine not because of any inherent property of the sound or the letters, but because we have learned and implicitly agreed to uphold the convention established within the English-speaking community. Learning a language is, in large part, learning an incredibly complex and nuanced set of symbolic conventions—phonological rules governing permissible sound combinations, morphological rules for word formation, syntactic rules for sentence structure, semantic norms regarding word meanings, and pragmatic rules concerning appropriate usage in different social contexts. These conventions allow us to decode the intentions behind others’ utterances with reasonable accuracy and encode our own intentions in a way that is likely to be understood by other members of the speech community. Without widespread adherence to these shared linguistic conventions, symbolic communication would quickly break down into mutual unintelligibility, rendering complex thought-sharing impossible. The later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein offers profound insights into the nature and function of these conventions through his concepts of **“language games”** and **“forms of life.”** In his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein moved away from the idea that words gain meaning primarily by referring to objects or corresponding to fixed mental concepts (a view he himself had earlier explored in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*). Instead, he proposed that the meaning of a word is largely determined by its **use** within specific, rule-governed activities or contexts—what he termed “language games.” The word “game” itself, he famously argued, lacks a single essential definition covering all instances (board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, games of chance); rather, its meaning arises from a “family resemblance” among the various activities we group under that label, activities embedded within specific social practices and rule structures. Similarly, words like “knowledge,” “belief,” “pain,” or “intention” derive their meaning not primarily from pointing to some private inner mental state, but from how they function within the public language games of asserting, questioning, doubting, justifying claims, expressing sympathy, making excuses, giving commands, describing sensations, etc. Understanding a symbol, for Wittgenstein, is therefore not about grasping a private mental definition but about knowing how to operate correctly with it within the relevant language game(s). This involves mastering the implicit rules, conventions, techniques, and expected responses associated with its use in particular situations. It’s a form of practical know-how, an ability to participate appropriately in a shared practice. These language games, in turn, are not isolated activities but are embedded within broader **“forms of life”**—the shared patterns of activity, culture, values, institutions, material practices, and background assumptions that constitute the overall context within which language makes sense and has purpose. For example, the language game of “giving and obeying orders” only makes sense within a form of life involving authority structures, hierarchical relationships, and coordinated action. The language game of “scientific hypothesis testing” presupposes a form of life valuing empirical evidence, logical reasoning, peer review, and the pursuit of objective knowledge. The meaning of symbols is thus inseparable from the practices and forms of life in which they are used. Wittgenstein’s perspective radically shifts the locus of meaning. Meaning is not a static property residing solely in the symbol (Level 1) or even purely in abstract beliefs or mental representations (Level 2), but emerges dynamically from the symbol’s conventional **use** within shared social practices (integrating Level 2 conventions with Level 3 behavior). Level 2, from this viewpoint, is less about a fixed set of propositional beliefs and more about a shared mastery of the rules and techniques for participating competently in various language games and social practices. The “shared understanding” is fundamentally a shared ability to *play the game* correctly according to the local, often unstated, conventions. This perspective powerfully highlights the pragmatic, context-dependent, embodied, and often implicit nature of the conventions that underpin the successful operation of symbolic meaning loops. We often know *how* to use a symbol meaningfully within our form of life long before we can explicitly articulate the complex rules governing its appropriate use. The establishment and maintenance of these conventions, whether linguistic or broader social norms associated with symbols, rely heavily on processes of **social learning**, imitation, correction, and reinforcement (Level 4 dynamics feeding back into Level 2). Children acquire language conventions largely through immersion in their speech community, interacting with caregivers and peers, gradually internalizing the patterns and rules through trial, error, and feedback. Deviations from convention—grammatical errors, pragmatic missteps, violations of social norms—are often met with various forms of feedback, ranging from confusion or requests for clarification (“What do you mean?”) to explicit correction (“We don’t say it that way”) or even social sanction (ridicule, disapproval, exclusion). This feedback constantly reinforces adherence to the shared norms and conventions. Over time, through repeated participation and reinforcement, these conventions become deeply ingrained, feeling natural, intuitive, and self-evident to participants within that particular form of life or language game. However, for these conventions and the broader belief systems they support to function effectively, especially in large, complex, anonymous societies involving interactions between strangers, another crucial element is required at Level 2: **social trust**. Trust, broadly understood as a willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the actions of others based on positive expectations about their intentions or competence, acts as the essential lubricant for the entire meaning loop. Without a baseline level of trust, the uncertainty inherent in relying on conventional symbols and predicting others’ behavior becomes paralyzing. In the context of symbolic loops, trust operates at multiple, interconnected levels. Firstly, there is **trust in the stability and shared understanding of conventions** themselves. We generally trust that other speakers of our language will use words according to their commonly accepted meanings, that drivers will generally obey traffic signals, that a handshake offered is generally a sign of peaceful intent. This trust allows us to navigate everyday interactions with a degree of predictability and reduced cognitive effort. Secondly, we often need **trust in the intentions of other participants** within a specific interaction or language game. We need to trust, at least provisionally, that others are using symbols sincerely, cooperatively (following principles like those outlined by philosopher Paul Grice regarding conversational maxims), and without deliberate intent to deceive, especially in situations involving negotiation, information sharing, or collaborative tasks (though this trust is, of course, often conditional and subject to verification). Thirdly, many of our beliefs about the world, particularly those extending beyond our direct experience (scientific facts, historical accounts, current events), rely heavily on **trust in information sources**. We must trust the credibility, expertise, and reliability of the individuals or institutions transmitting that information—scientists, journalists, educators, historians, authoritative texts, news organizations. Assessing the trustworthiness of sources becomes a critical cognitive skill in navigating complex, information-rich societies, especially in the digital age where misinformation can proliferate easily. Fourthly, many large-scale symbolic loops, particularly those involving institutional facts like money, law, property rights, or democratic governance, depend critically on **trust in the institutions** responsible for defining symbols, establishing conventions, regulating behavior, guaranteeing outcomes, and acting as impartial arbiters. We trust banks to honor deposits represented by digital numbers, courts to apply laws symbolized in statutes fairly, scientific journals to ensure rigor through peer review symbolized by publication, election bodies to count votes symbolized by ballots accurately. This institutional trust provides a crucial stabilizing framework for the Level 2 beliefs that underpin these complex social orders. When trust erodes at any of these levels—due to perceived widespread deception, institutional corruption or failure, the breakdown of social norms, deep ideological polarization leading to incompatible interpretations of symbols, or the deliberate spread of disinformation—the shared belief systems at Level 2 become fragile and contested. Communication becomes fraught with suspicion, cooperation becomes difficult, symbols lose their agreed-upon meaning or become potent weapons in social conflict, and the entire strange loop can destabilize or collapse. Consider the societal impact of widespread political polarization where trust between opposing groups evaporates, leading to fundamentally different interpretations of the same events, symbols, and information sources, effectively fragmenting shared reality. Similarly, a financial crisis often involves a rapid collapse of trust in monetary symbols and the financial institutions backing them, causing the economic loop to seize up. Rebuilding trust, once significantly damaged, is often an arduous and lengthy process, requiring demonstrated competence, transparency, accountability, the re-establishment of reliable conventions, and the construction of credible, unifying narratives. Therefore, Level 2 of the Levels of Meaning Loop, the engine driving shared reality, is not just about grand narratives or explicit beliefs. It is equally constituted by the intricate, often invisible, web of **conventions**—learned through practice, context-dependent, and governing the appropriate use of symbols within specific language games and forms of life, as highlighted by Wittgenstein. And the entire system, from simple linguistic exchange to complex social institutions, is critically dependent on a pervasive, yet potentially fragile, foundation of **social trust**—trust in conventions, in others’ intentions, in information sources, and in institutions. These elements—narrative, belief, convention, trust—work together dynamically to assign significance to Level 1 symbols, thereby enabling the meaningful actions, perceptions, and affective responses of Level 3, and providing the crucial cognitive and cultural content that is subsequently reinforced and reproduced at Level 4. Having explored the role of narrative in the previous chapter, and convention and trust here, the next chapter will examine the specific mechanisms by which Level 2 beliefs are often formalized and enforced through the power of institutional facts and symbolic declarations. --- [9 Declaring Reality](releases/2025/Strange%20Loop%20of%20Being/9%20Declaring%20Reality.md)