**Appendix C: Detailed Graph Data (Edges)** **C.7: Edges Originating from Philosophy Nodes** | Source Node ID | Target Node ID | Type | Rationale | Conf. | Dir. | |:------------------------ |:--------------------------- |:------- |:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |:---- |:--- | | `Phil::Physicalism` | `Physics` | `O-DEP` | Physicalism, particularly theory-based versions, defines the “physical” based on the content provided by physical theories. | H | D | | `Phil::Physicalism` | `CM` | `L-CON` | The ontology of classical mechanics (matter, forces, absolute spacetime) is generally considered compatible with physicalism/materialism. | M/H | S | | `Phil::Physicalism` | `QM::MeasurementProblem` | `F-CHL` | The measurement problem, especially interpretations involving consciousness or observer effects, challenges standard physicalist assumptions. | M/H | D | | `Phil::Physicalism` | `GR::DynamicSpacetime` | `F-REQ` | Physicalism needs to provide a clear ontological account of dynamic spacetime–is it a fundamental physical entity or emergent? | M | D | | `Phil::Physicalism` | `Phil::OntologicalMonism` | `L-ENT` | Physicalism entails ontological monism, asserting only physical substance/properties are fundamental. | H | D | | `Phil::Physicalism` | `Phil::CausalClosure` | `F-BAS` | Physicalism often assumes or argues for the causal closure of the physical domain as a core tenet. | M/H | D | | `Phil::OntologicalMonism` | `Phil::Physicalism` | `S-COMP` | Ontological monism is a core component defining the physicalist thesis. | H | D | | `Phil::CausalClosure` | `Phil::Physicalism` | `F-BAS` | Causal closure provides support for physicalism by excluding non-physical causes for physical events. | M/H | D | | `Phil::CausalClosure` | `QM::IntrinsicIndeterminism` | `F-CHL` | If quantum events lack sufficient *physical* causes (are truly random), it challenges strict causal closure. | M | D | | `Phil::Supervenience` | `Phil::Physicalism` | `S-FORM` | Supervenience is often used to formalize the dependence relationship between mental/higher-level properties and physical properties within physicalism. | H | D | | `Phil::Fundamentality` | `Physics` | `E-XPL` | Physics seeks fundamental laws and entities, directly engaging with the philosophical concept of fundamentality. | H | D | | `Phil::Fundamentality` | `Phil::Grounding` | `F-BAS` | The concept of grounding is a primary tool used in contemporary metaphysics to analyze fundamentality relationships. | H | D | | `Phil::Grounding` | `Phil::Fundamentality` | `S-FORM` | Grounding provides a formal way to express claims about what is metaphysically fundamental relative to what is derived. | H | D | | `Phil::Grounding` | `Phil::Physicalism` | `S-FORM` | Physicalists often use grounding to state that mental/biological properties are grounded in physical properties. | H | D | | `Phil::Causation` | `Physics` | `E-XPL` | Physical laws (e.g., force laws, field equations) are typically interpreted as describing causal relationships or enabling causal explanations. | H | D | | `Phil::Causation` | `CM::Law2_Force` | `L-INST` | F=ma provides a specific instance of a causal law (force causes acceleration). | H | D | | `Phil::Causation` | `GR::EFE` | `L-INST` | EFE describe how stress-energy causes spacetime curvature, which in turn dictates motion (a form of causation). | H | D | | `Phil::Causation` | `Thermo::SecondLaw` | `C-INF` | While not strictly causal, the Second Law provides constraints on possible causal processes (directionality). | M | D | | `Phil::Determinism` | `CM::Determinism` | `F-BAS` | The philosophical concept of determinism finds a strong exemplar in the deterministic nature of classical mechanics. | H | D | | `Phil::Determinism` | `QM::IntrinsicIndeterminism` | `L-CTR` | The philosophical thesis of determinism is contradicted by the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics. | H | S | | `Phil::Realism` | `CM::ObjectiveProperties` | `L-CON` | Scientific realism aligns well with the classical view of objective, measurement-independent properties. | H | S | | `Phil::Realism` | `QM::MeasurementCollapse` | `F-CHL` | Measurement collapse and contextuality in QM pose significant challenges to naive forms of scientific realism about properties. | H | D | | `Phil::LocalRealism` | `Concept::Locality` | `F-BAS` | Local realism combines the classical assumptions of locality and realism regarding pre-existing properties. | H | D | | `Phil::LocalRealism` | `Phil::Realism` | `F-BAS` | Local realism combines the classical assumptions of locality and realism regarding pre-existing properties. | H | D | | `Phil::LocalRealism` | `QM::Entanglement` | `L-CTR` | Quantum entanglement, via Bell’s theorem violations, demonstrably contradicts local realism. | H | S | | | | | | | |