Quick read
HM-LWE v3.0
In the paper's words
Hidden-modulus LWE: novel hardness assumption
The abstract, verbatim, and its opening sentence is the claim. Every line below is quoted from the text.
Numbers it reports
The hidden-modulus advantage is a multiplicative factor of approximately $2^{248}$ — equivalent to adding approximately 248 bits of effective key entropy. [my conjecture] Alternative strategy (direct lattice without $p$): Without $p$, the adversary faces a simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem: given $b_i = \langle a_i, s \rangle - q_i \cdot p + e_i$ where $q_i = \lfloor \langle a_i, s \rangle / p \rfloor$ are unknown integers, find $s$ and $p$ such that all residuals are small.
from 4.2. Hidden-Modulus Advantage: Multiplicative FactorMetric N-SRE-128 (n=512) Kyber-1024 Factor Decapsulate (C, est.) ~530 ms 0.03 ms 17,700× Encapsulate (C, est.) ~250 ms 0.03 ms 8,300× KeyGen <1 ms 0.025 ms ~40× Ciphertext ~25 KB 1.6 KB 16× Security assumption HM-LWE (novel) MLWE (standardized) — Decapsulation dominates at $O(n^3)$ due to Gaussian elimination over $\mathbb{Z}_p$.
from 6.2. Efficiency CharacterizationEfficiency is honestly characterized: the scheme is approximately four orders of magnitude slower than Kyber-1024 and has 16× larger ciphertexts.
from 8.1. SummaryWe present N-SRE-LWE, a key encapsulation mechanism built on HM-LWE, prove its IND-CPA security via a KEM+DEM hybrid argument, and provide a reference implementation with experimental verification at toy scale (100% correctness across 500 random messages).
from AbstractAt deployment parameters ($n = 512$, 256-bit $p$), N-SRE-LWE requires approximately 25 KB ciphertexts and decapsulation times on the order of 500 ms in optimized C — approximately four orders of magnitude slower than Kyber-1024.
from AbstractCiphertext sizes of approximately 25 KB for N-SRE-128 with seed-generated $A$.
from 1.3. Contributions
How it is done
We prove that when the modulus is known, HM-LWE reduces to standard (noise-free) linear algebra over $\mathbb{Z}_p$, placing it in the same computational class as lattice problems.
from AbstractSecurity analysis: Proof that known-$p$ HM-LWE reduces to linear algebra over $\mathbb{Z}_p$ (Observation 1); construction and analysis of the Kannan embedding lattice attack; quantification of the hidden-modulus advantage as a multiplicative $\pi(p_{\max})$ factor; identification and resolution of the $a_i$-range leakage.
from 1.3. ContributionsSection 5 presents the N-SRE-LWE construction and IND-CPA proof.
from 1.4. StructureObservation 1 provides an UPPER BOUND on HM-LWE complexity: HM-LWE is not harder than linear algebra over $\mathbb{Z}_p$ when $p$ is known.
from 3.2. Relationship to Standard LWE
What would falsify it
If the adversary knows $p$, then HM-LWE reduces to solving a linear system over $\mathbb{Z}_p$ (noiseless).
from 3.2. Relationship to Standard LWE
Where the claim stops
We introduce Hidden-Modulus Learning With Errors (HM-LWE), a cryptographic hardness assumption that generalizes standard LWE by making the modulus an additional secret rather than a public parameter.
from AbstractWe quantify the hidden-modulus advantage as a multiplicative factor of $\pi(p_{\max}) \approx 2^{248}$ for 256-bit primes — the adversary must enumerate candidates for $p$ before lattice reduction can be applied, because the correct lattice embedding (Kannan) cannot be constructed without knowing the modulus.
from AbstractAt deployment parameters ($n = 512$, 256-bit $p$), N-SRE-LWE requires approximately 25 KB ciphertexts and decapsulation times on the order of 500 ms in optimized C — approximately four orders of magnitude slower than Kyber-1024.
from Abstract
Where to read
- Abstract338 words · 1 min
- 1. Introduction711 words · 3 min
- 2. Preliminaries380 words · 2 min
- 3. The Hidden-Modulus LWE Problem283 words · 1 min
- 4. Security Analysis688 words · 3 min
- 5. N-SRE-LWE: Key Encapsulation Mechanism584 words · 3 min
- 6. Parameter Selection and Performance292 words · 1 min
- 7. Experimental Verification190 words · 1 min
- 8. Conclusion and Open Problems368 words · 2 min
- Declarations54 words · 1 min
- Appendix A: Deprecated Per-Digit Noise Variant185 words · 1 min
Read from the paper itself: 35 sections, 4,303 words. Nothing on this page is written by a model; a line that is not a sentence of the paper is not shown. Have a specific question? Ask this paper.